Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates has demonstrated the capability to make Command decisions. He replaced the Secretary of the Army and the Army Surgeon General over the Walter Reed scandal. Now, he has proposed disestablishing the US Joint Forces Command.
When commentators such as David Gergen, CNN and LTG Russell Honore, USA (ret) on CNN were suggesting that the Obama Administration needed to improve Command and Control in responding to the Gulf of Mexico Oil Incident, Secretary Gates could offer no help from the Defense Department.
The closest to a “General Operations Command” that currently exists in the Unified Command Plan (UCP) is the United States Joint Forces Command. The same day the press reports that a woman, for the first time, is appointed to head one of the nation’s 16 intelligence agencies the Secretary of Defense proposes the disestablishment of the only command with responsibility for conventional (general purpose) forces.
Strategically, eliminating one of the major organizational elements is the fastest way to cut costs. Unless our intelligence community is smart enough to accurately identify all our threats in a timely manner, we need to maintain some general purpose forces that can be deployed to counter the actual threat that materializes – be it natural or manmade.
The Navy has traditionally resisted “jointness”. For the old LANTCOM to become the Joint (Forces) Command was asking a lot but we need something to fulfill the mission held by the Readiness Command while it was in existence.
One of the problems is that strategic people can’t understand a generic Joint Task Force. When I first read the definition of a JTF (in JCS Pub 1, I suppose), I think it included the word “temporary”.
The US Constitution empowers Congress to provide an Army and a Navy. The Federal Government is responsible for our common Defense. There is no need to invoke the Commerce Clause.
Doing away with the United States Joint Forces Command may be the smart thing to do. If so, I hope the administration does it “smartly”. I am not optimistic. I had already concluded that the Obama Administration is blind with respect to Military C2.
During the Cold War, "conventional" meant non-nuclear. The logical definition now for "conventional" appears to be non-special.
We need to maintain traditional (Army) Military Command and Control (MilC2) capability.
(DR)2H
Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Saturday, July 31, 2010
Lessons Learned
Could a “Lessons Learned” be related to a “Teachable Moment”?
While I was still trying desperately hard to earn my pay as a part of the Defense community, my corporation implemented its Systems Engineering website as: Process, Procedures, Tools, and Lessons Learned. Or something similar. There were no Lessons Learned from the past but there was a new database application to record future lessons learned.
My doctorate is in experimental elementary particle physics and my specialty was strong interactions. This was the branch of physics that collected lots of data (bubble chamber photographs), processed them, and then looked for statistical anomalies in the results.
Accelerators, detection devices, and computers were state-of-the-art technology but they were just tools. The information was in the data.
I shared the experience of many during recent decades: I prepared numerous resumes for the newly developed (again) Corporate Database. In 2001, I expressed displeasure with my academic department for sending me a form to provide information for the new department database that was included in the label on the envelope in which the form was received.
I excelled in FORTRAN but I also learned to appreciate COBOL. My working community seemed to like IDEF0; I liked IDEF1X. BPwin was favored by business people; I liked ERwin. My co-workers worked on Conventional Planning and Execution and JDS (Joint Deployment System); I worked on RUM (Resource and Unit Monitoring) and UNIREP.
I have been trained (or learned) that the signal is in the data.
I believe one of the quotes sometimes attributed to Yogi Berra is, “You can hear a lot by just listening.”
If you just listened to a Breitbart interview on CNN, you would have heard that the tape wasn’t about Shirley Sherrod; it was about the NAACP. If you just listened to the “excerpted “tape, you could hear many in the audience chuckle. That was supposed to be the “message” the blogger wanted us to hear.
The Shirley Sherrod incident illustrates the Fog of War. Since it’s not a real war, collateral damage to Shirley Sherrod can be minimized. In a real war, few victims are as lucky.
Gen. Lewis W. Walt, USMC, had a reputation for relieving officers of their command. His view was to protect the units by getting rid of all the bad officers. There were enough good Marines that could fill in for the good ones that were relieved.
“Teachable Moments” may have the same experience as Lessons Learned. People have suggested changing the name to “Lessons Observed”. The rationale is that it is a more descriptive title. The lesson may be observed (possibly, again) but we don’t seem to be able to Learn It. Would the more accurate description for Teachable Moments be “Regrettable Moments”?
(DR)2H
While I was still trying desperately hard to earn my pay as a part of the Defense community, my corporation implemented its Systems Engineering website as: Process, Procedures, Tools, and Lessons Learned. Or something similar. There were no Lessons Learned from the past but there was a new database application to record future lessons learned.
My doctorate is in experimental elementary particle physics and my specialty was strong interactions. This was the branch of physics that collected lots of data (bubble chamber photographs), processed them, and then looked for statistical anomalies in the results.
Accelerators, detection devices, and computers were state-of-the-art technology but they were just tools. The information was in the data.
I shared the experience of many during recent decades: I prepared numerous resumes for the newly developed (again) Corporate Database. In 2001, I expressed displeasure with my academic department for sending me a form to provide information for the new department database that was included in the label on the envelope in which the form was received.
I excelled in FORTRAN but I also learned to appreciate COBOL. My working community seemed to like IDEF0; I liked IDEF1X. BPwin was favored by business people; I liked ERwin. My co-workers worked on Conventional Planning and Execution and JDS (Joint Deployment System); I worked on RUM (Resource and Unit Monitoring) and UNIREP.
I have been trained (or learned) that the signal is in the data.
I believe one of the quotes sometimes attributed to Yogi Berra is, “You can hear a lot by just listening.”
If you just listened to a Breitbart interview on CNN, you would have heard that the tape wasn’t about Shirley Sherrod; it was about the NAACP. If you just listened to the “excerpted “tape, you could hear many in the audience chuckle. That was supposed to be the “message” the blogger wanted us to hear.
The Shirley Sherrod incident illustrates the Fog of War. Since it’s not a real war, collateral damage to Shirley Sherrod can be minimized. In a real war, few victims are as lucky.
Gen. Lewis W. Walt, USMC, had a reputation for relieving officers of their command. His view was to protect the units by getting rid of all the bad officers. There were enough good Marines that could fill in for the good ones that were relieved.
“Teachable Moments” may have the same experience as Lessons Learned. People have suggested changing the name to “Lessons Observed”. The rationale is that it is a more descriptive title. The lesson may be observed (possibly, again) but we don’t seem to be able to Learn It. Would the more accurate description for Teachable Moments be “Regrettable Moments”?
(DR)2H
Tuesday, July 20, 2010
Why the Obama Administration Is Impotent in the Gulf
The Obama Administration has no George S. Patton, Jr., Alexander M. Haig, Jr., or H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Jr., but could have Russel L. Honore.
Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates has demonstrated the capability to make Command decisions. He replaced the Secretary of the Army and the Army Surgeon General over the Walter Reed scandal.
Secretary Gates has an outstanding resume. He joined the Central Intelligence Agency in 1966 and spent nearly 27 years as an intelligence professional. During that period, he spent nearly nine years at the National Security Council, The White House, serving four presidents of both political parties.
In 2007, Sec. Gates did not renominate the first Marine to serve as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Peter Pace. Adm. Mullen was Gates’ choice for the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Robert Gates removed General David D. McKiernan from command in Afghanistan on May 6, 2009. Gates replaced him with LTG Stanley A. McChrystal. The Washington Post called it "a rare decision to remove a wartime commander." The Washington Post described the replacement as one of several replacements of Generals who represented the "traditional Army" with Generals "who have pressed for the use of counter-insurgency tactics." See http://bit.ly/14mM2I .
Gen. David Petraeus, USA, “wrote the book on Counter-Insurgency” but I’m not sure that VP Joe Biden and other Presidential advisors have read the book.
Where is the “traditional Army” represented? The traditional Army is the Army created in accordance with Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution. “The Congress shall have Power …To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two years.”
The Washington Post ‘s Top Secret America (http://bit.ly/9Ja5Fi ) describes how Intel has taken over since September 11, 2001.
Who could advise President Obama on protecting our coastal areas?
All the “improvements” since 9/11 made the situation more difficult for the admistration. Also, Obama has a Nobel Laureate and the National Labs helping the incident commander or whoever was in charge.
We need someone with traditional (Army) Military Command and Control experience. Particularly on the Ops side of the interface. Perhaps we should establish a GOC (General Operations Command).
(DR)2H
Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates has demonstrated the capability to make Command decisions. He replaced the Secretary of the Army and the Army Surgeon General over the Walter Reed scandal.
Secretary Gates has an outstanding resume. He joined the Central Intelligence Agency in 1966 and spent nearly 27 years as an intelligence professional. During that period, he spent nearly nine years at the National Security Council, The White House, serving four presidents of both political parties.
In 2007, Sec. Gates did not renominate the first Marine to serve as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Peter Pace. Adm. Mullen was Gates’ choice for the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Robert Gates removed General David D. McKiernan from command in Afghanistan on May 6, 2009. Gates replaced him with LTG Stanley A. McChrystal. The Washington Post called it "a rare decision to remove a wartime commander." The Washington Post described the replacement as one of several replacements of Generals who represented the "traditional Army" with Generals "who have pressed for the use of counter-insurgency tactics." See http://bit.ly/14mM2I .
Gen. David Petraeus, USA, “wrote the book on Counter-Insurgency” but I’m not sure that VP Joe Biden and other Presidential advisors have read the book.
Where is the “traditional Army” represented? The traditional Army is the Army created in accordance with Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution. “The Congress shall have Power …To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two years.”
The Washington Post ‘s Top Secret America (http://bit.ly/9Ja5Fi ) describes how Intel has taken over since September 11, 2001.
Who could advise President Obama on protecting our coastal areas?
All the “improvements” since 9/11 made the situation more difficult for the admistration. Also, Obama has a Nobel Laureate and the National Labs helping the incident commander or whoever was in charge.
We need someone with traditional (Army) Military Command and Control experience. Particularly on the Ops side of the interface. Perhaps we should establish a GOC (General Operations Command).
(DR)2H
Tuesday, July 13, 2010
The Fog of War
Military commanders must cope with the uncertainty/ambiguity described as the “fog of war”. In peacetime we may be able to afford the luxury of eliminating all the unknowns. In a war, we cannot. Protecting our coastal areas in the Gulf of Mexico should have been a war. Perhaps generating jobs, jobs, jobs should have been also. The Obama administration appears to believe they can eliminate the fog of war. They appear to be being successful by avoiding war.
The Wiki entry for “Fog of War” describes four levels: Global Strategic, Military Strategic, Operational, and Tactical. The last two are discussed below.
Operational
At the operational level, the theatre commander undertakes tasks as directed by the Military Strategic level, ambiguity related to adversary capability and intent is coupled with own directive ambiguity, the commander not having a full understanding of the strategic imperative. The operational tempo increases at this level and the ambiguity experienced by the commander is susceptible to delays in communication of the tactical situation, the ebb and flow of own force and adversary force interaction. The commander seeks to penetrate the fog of war through significant use of reconnaissance assets and a comprehensive Joint Operational Picture.
Tactical
Ambiguity stems from several factors at the tactical level. Deliberate actions by the enemy (including active deception and/or electronic attack on communications and sensors) contribute as well as factors inherent to battle resulting in lack of comprehension by commanders as to the tactical environment, the logistic status of their own units, how they are interacting with each other, or their intentions. This lack of comprehension can stem from many factors, individually or in combination, such as poor reconnaissance; inaccurate intelligence; or faulty communication. The tempo of decision making at the tactical level is much greater than at other levels, increasing the risk of escalating ambiguity as assumptions build. Real world consequences follow as resources are allocated based on those assumptions.
The fog of war is most easily demonstrated in the tactical battlespace. It may include military commanders' incomplete or inaccurate intelligence concerning their enemy's numbers, disposition, capabilities, and intent, regarding features of the battlefield, and even including incomplete knowledge of the state of their own forces. Fog of war is caused by the limits of reconnaissance, by the enemy's feints and disinformation, by delays in receiving intelligence and difficulties passing orders, and by the difficult task of forming a cogent picture from a very large (or very small) amount of diverse data.
When a force engages in battle and the urgency for good intelligence increases, so does the fog of war and chaos of the battlefield, while military units become preoccupied with fighting or are lost (either destroyed by enemy fire or literally lose their way), reconnaissance and liaison elements become unavailable, and sometimes while real fog and smoke obscure vision. Much of the modern military's technological efforts, under the rubric of “command and control” seek to reduce the fog of war. Although even the most advanced technology cannot completely eliminate it, military theorists continue to develop ways to reduce it.
Adapted from July 13, 2010, Wikipedia entry subject to http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/
For additional reading see: Alan D. Campen, ed., The First Information War (Fairfax: AFCEA International Press 1992).
(DR)2H
The Wiki entry for “Fog of War” describes four levels: Global Strategic, Military Strategic, Operational, and Tactical. The last two are discussed below.
Operational
At the operational level, the theatre commander undertakes tasks as directed by the Military Strategic level, ambiguity related to adversary capability and intent is coupled with own directive ambiguity, the commander not having a full understanding of the strategic imperative. The operational tempo increases at this level and the ambiguity experienced by the commander is susceptible to delays in communication of the tactical situation, the ebb and flow of own force and adversary force interaction. The commander seeks to penetrate the fog of war through significant use of reconnaissance assets and a comprehensive Joint Operational Picture.
Tactical
Ambiguity stems from several factors at the tactical level. Deliberate actions by the enemy (including active deception and/or electronic attack on communications and sensors) contribute as well as factors inherent to battle resulting in lack of comprehension by commanders as to the tactical environment, the logistic status of their own units, how they are interacting with each other, or their intentions. This lack of comprehension can stem from many factors, individually or in combination, such as poor reconnaissance; inaccurate intelligence; or faulty communication. The tempo of decision making at the tactical level is much greater than at other levels, increasing the risk of escalating ambiguity as assumptions build. Real world consequences follow as resources are allocated based on those assumptions.
The fog of war is most easily demonstrated in the tactical battlespace. It may include military commanders' incomplete or inaccurate intelligence concerning their enemy's numbers, disposition, capabilities, and intent, regarding features of the battlefield, and even including incomplete knowledge of the state of their own forces. Fog of war is caused by the limits of reconnaissance, by the enemy's feints and disinformation, by delays in receiving intelligence and difficulties passing orders, and by the difficult task of forming a cogent picture from a very large (or very small) amount of diverse data.
When a force engages in battle and the urgency for good intelligence increases, so does the fog of war and chaos of the battlefield, while military units become preoccupied with fighting or are lost (either destroyed by enemy fire or literally lose their way), reconnaissance and liaison elements become unavailable, and sometimes while real fog and smoke obscure vision. Much of the modern military's technological efforts, under the rubric of “command and control” seek to reduce the fog of war. Although even the most advanced technology cannot completely eliminate it, military theorists continue to develop ways to reduce it.
Adapted from July 13, 2010, Wikipedia entry subject to http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/
For additional reading see: Alan D. Campen, ed., The First Information War (Fairfax: AFCEA International Press 1992).
(DR)2H
Friday, July 9, 2010
The OPS/INTEL Interface
In the late 1970s or early 1980s, the Ops/Intel interface was considered to be an important problem area in military command and control. Getting the right information to the right people at the right time continues to be a challenge.
For various reasons, my experience has been more on the “Ops” side than on the “Intel” side. I have tended to think of the Intel side as “arrogant” and possessing an inflated sense of self importance, consistent with the recent Gen McChrystal incident.
Willie F. Sutton would have been on the Intel side because that’s where the money is/was. The Ops side was where the “rubber meets the road” and you have to deal with reality which appeals to my physics and farm background.
I was not convinced by the “evidence” that Saddam Hussein possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction. I did not support the Invasion of Iraq. However, I have tended to agree with Senator John McCain on troop strength and withdrawal.
When I started this blog, I intended to focus on “the incident” in the Gulf of Mexico. President Obama and the USA need advice from people experienced in general purpose military command and control. They need someone with experience in “decentralized execution”. They need someone with experience in large-scale operations on the “Ops” side of the interface. Special operations tend not to be large scale and get “special” treatment.
The Obama Administration’s policy on the Gulf “incident” is that it is “new” which means that he and his staff will make mistakes. One of them is that he has not decentralized control enough to allow anyone to do anything in a reasonable time. Basically, the top will make mistakes but no one below will (except not do something.) There was an election. Obama gets to make the mistakes not the States, the Parishes, or the (little) people.
Parsons and Perry wrote a report (Concepts for Command and Control Systems) for Systems Development Corporation dated December 23, 1965, which outlines a model of the military process consisting of five functions (sense, analyze, decide, act, communicate) at command points. The short version is “assess the situation and take appropriate action”. The Obama version at the lower levels is “Update the Plan and Resubmit”.
The McChrystal incident caught my attention and caused me to do research on General Petraeus who “wrote the book on CounterInsurgency”. I’ve now gotten better informed on Counter Insurgency versus Counter Terrorism. I will comment on that more in a later blog.
Peter Beinart says that the most impolitic thing that McChrystal himself said was that he feels hectored by Holbrooke. http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-06-23/general-mcchrystal-failing-to-follow-obamas-afghan-policy/.
The article goes on to say that Obama should fire Gen. McChrystal for the difference in policy. The article discusses how McChrystal pushed for a Counter Insurgency policy.
We could use a good Army General’s input with respect to the Gulf Incident. I recommended Colin Powell earlier. David Petraeus would be a good candidate but not filtered through a Marine (James Jones or James Mattis).
Obama needs help with tactical military C2. A Navy blimp has arrived in the Gulf area. The Army used to use Balloons for artillery observers. Neither the Oil nor the Dispersant shoots at these.
(DR)2H
For various reasons, my experience has been more on the “Ops” side than on the “Intel” side. I have tended to think of the Intel side as “arrogant” and possessing an inflated sense of self importance, consistent with the recent Gen McChrystal incident.
Willie F. Sutton would have been on the Intel side because that’s where the money is/was. The Ops side was where the “rubber meets the road” and you have to deal with reality which appeals to my physics and farm background.
I was not convinced by the “evidence” that Saddam Hussein possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction. I did not support the Invasion of Iraq. However, I have tended to agree with Senator John McCain on troop strength and withdrawal.
When I started this blog, I intended to focus on “the incident” in the Gulf of Mexico. President Obama and the USA need advice from people experienced in general purpose military command and control. They need someone with experience in “decentralized execution”. They need someone with experience in large-scale operations on the “Ops” side of the interface. Special operations tend not to be large scale and get “special” treatment.
The Obama Administration’s policy on the Gulf “incident” is that it is “new” which means that he and his staff will make mistakes. One of them is that he has not decentralized control enough to allow anyone to do anything in a reasonable time. Basically, the top will make mistakes but no one below will (except not do something.) There was an election. Obama gets to make the mistakes not the States, the Parishes, or the (little) people.
Parsons and Perry wrote a report (Concepts for Command and Control Systems) for Systems Development Corporation dated December 23, 1965, which outlines a model of the military process consisting of five functions (sense, analyze, decide, act, communicate) at command points. The short version is “assess the situation and take appropriate action”. The Obama version at the lower levels is “Update the Plan and Resubmit”.
The McChrystal incident caught my attention and caused me to do research on General Petraeus who “wrote the book on CounterInsurgency”. I’ve now gotten better informed on Counter Insurgency versus Counter Terrorism. I will comment on that more in a later blog.
Peter Beinart says that the most impolitic thing that McChrystal himself said was that he feels hectored by Holbrooke. http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-06-23/general-mcchrystal-failing-to-follow-obamas-afghan-policy/.
The article goes on to say that Obama should fire Gen. McChrystal for the difference in policy. The article discusses how McChrystal pushed for a Counter Insurgency policy.
We could use a good Army General’s input with respect to the Gulf Incident. I recommended Colin Powell earlier. David Petraeus would be a good candidate but not filtered through a Marine (James Jones or James Mattis).
Obama needs help with tactical military C2. A Navy blimp has arrived in the Gulf area. The Army used to use Balloons for artillery observers. Neither the Oil nor the Dispersant shoots at these.
(DR)2H
Thursday, July 8, 2010
We Need Military C2 In the Mix
The Obama administration needs some experienced military commanders in the mix. General David Petraeus, USA, is an exemplar.
Gen. Petraeus’s successor at CENTCOM has been announced. It is Gen. James Mattis, USMC. I like the Corps but Marines (even Generals) fall under the Department of Navy.
LTG Honore, USA (ret), has spoken eloquently on CNN about the need for military style C2 in the Gulf of Mexico. David Gergen with the John F. Kennedy School of Leadership at Harvard University has commented repeatedly on the need for the administration to show leadership in the Gulf.
The President is surrounded by too many Naval Officers and people who tend to think the same way. The President needs someone of Petraeus’s caliber in his inner circle.
(DR)2H
Gen. Petraeus’s successor at CENTCOM has been announced. It is Gen. James Mattis, USMC. I like the Corps but Marines (even Generals) fall under the Department of Navy.
LTG Honore, USA (ret), has spoken eloquently on CNN about the need for military style C2 in the Gulf of Mexico. David Gergen with the John F. Kennedy School of Leadership at Harvard University has commented repeatedly on the need for the administration to show leadership in the Gulf.
The President is surrounded by too many Naval Officers and people who tend to think the same way. The President needs someone of Petraeus’s caliber in his inner circle.
(DR)2H
Wednesday, June 23, 2010
Obama needs someone like Colin Powell
I have been trying to help our country improve tactical C2 in the Gulf of Mexico region. Now, the schism with Gen. McChrystal extends the need for military C2 to theater level.
I am 70 years old, served in the MO Army National Guard, was an Analyst for the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), the US Navy's think tank, I was a part of the Ground Combat Section of the Marine Corps Operations Analysis Group (MCOAG). I was the national specialist on Amphibious operations (NWP-22B and LFM-01). I went to Vietnam as a part of my work for MCOAG on the Mine and Booby Trap problem.
I completed the Counter-Insurgency Course for Senior Officers at Quantico.
I have a PhD from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in Experimental Elementary Particle Physics. I have experience with Quantum Mechanics and Relativity. The big names in physics in those days were Schwinger, Feynman, Yang, Lee, Gell-mann, and a fellow on the west coast who spelled his name Chew. That Chew was brilliant but never won a Nobel Prize.
I spent 27 years inside the DC beltway. I discovered the Cato Institute while they were in San Francisco. I have worked for CNA, the National Academy of Sciences, the Dept of Army, BDM and TRW which are now a part of Northrop Grumman, Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) all in the DC area and Harris Corporation in Melbourne, FL.
When I was with CNA, I worked mostly for the Marines Corps Group but I did a little bit of nuclear work for a Navy Group.
During the Carter administration, I supported NATO Initiatives and was a major contributor to Measure 6B8. I was the initial Program Manager of BDM’s contract to develop the Technical Interface Design Plan – Test Edition for the GAMO Program. This was the first joint full spectrum tactical command and control program. I also supported the collection and processing of the Joint Operational Information Requirements for the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) Information System (WIS).
The short version is that I have experience with all of our military and naval services including helping develop the Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS) to support Mobilization and Sustainment.
A week or so ago, I started sending out tweets with #milc2 in them for military C2 mostly related to the Gulf. I peaked at 5 followers. I think I'm down to 3 now.
I watch CNN regularly. My home area here in Missouri is strongly Republican. I tend to agree with David Gergen on almost everything.
I was chairman of the Tactical C3 working group in the Military Operations Research Society (MORS). I have tactical, theater, and strategic C2 experience.
The Obama Administration needs assistance with large scale tactical military C2. I think I can communicate with Chu. I am willing to help in whatever ways I can.
Our country needs Colin Powell to serve as an advisor to the President on military command and control matters. I came to this conclusion based only on the need to address the Deepwater Horizon incident (BP Oil Spill) in the Gulf of Mexico. LTG Russel Honore, USA (ret.) makes a lot of sense when he speaks on the situation in the Gulf to CNN.
Our country needs a Military Officer in Obama’s inner circle. Someone of 4 star level in the Army (preferably) or the Air Force needs to be there. General James L. Jones, USMC (retired) was commissioned as a Marine officer. Marines come (and go) under the Secretary of Navy. Our Vice President’s son was a Marine. Adm Thad Allen is US Coast Guard. The US Army needs to be represented.
Donald R. Hodge, PhD.
I am 70 years old, served in the MO Army National Guard, was an Analyst for the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), the US Navy's think tank, I was a part of the Ground Combat Section of the Marine Corps Operations Analysis Group (MCOAG). I was the national specialist on Amphibious operations (NWP-22B and LFM-01). I went to Vietnam as a part of my work for MCOAG on the Mine and Booby Trap problem.
I completed the Counter-Insurgency Course for Senior Officers at Quantico.
I have a PhD from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in Experimental Elementary Particle Physics. I have experience with Quantum Mechanics and Relativity. The big names in physics in those days were Schwinger, Feynman, Yang, Lee, Gell-mann, and a fellow on the west coast who spelled his name Chew. That Chew was brilliant but never won a Nobel Prize.
I spent 27 years inside the DC beltway. I discovered the Cato Institute while they were in San Francisco. I have worked for CNA, the National Academy of Sciences, the Dept of Army, BDM and TRW which are now a part of Northrop Grumman, Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) all in the DC area and Harris Corporation in Melbourne, FL.
When I was with CNA, I worked mostly for the Marines Corps Group but I did a little bit of nuclear work for a Navy Group.
During the Carter administration, I supported NATO Initiatives and was a major contributor to Measure 6B8. I was the initial Program Manager of BDM’s contract to develop the Technical Interface Design Plan – Test Edition for the GAMO Program. This was the first joint full spectrum tactical command and control program. I also supported the collection and processing of the Joint Operational Information Requirements for the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) Information System (WIS).
The short version is that I have experience with all of our military and naval services including helping develop the Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS) to support Mobilization and Sustainment.
A week or so ago, I started sending out tweets with #milc2 in them for military C2 mostly related to the Gulf. I peaked at 5 followers. I think I'm down to 3 now.
I watch CNN regularly. My home area here in Missouri is strongly Republican. I tend to agree with David Gergen on almost everything.
I was chairman of the Tactical C3 working group in the Military Operations Research Society (MORS). I have tactical, theater, and strategic C2 experience.
The Obama Administration needs assistance with large scale tactical military C2. I think I can communicate with Chu. I am willing to help in whatever ways I can.
Our country needs Colin Powell to serve as an advisor to the President on military command and control matters. I came to this conclusion based only on the need to address the Deepwater Horizon incident (BP Oil Spill) in the Gulf of Mexico. LTG Russel Honore, USA (ret.) makes a lot of sense when he speaks on the situation in the Gulf to CNN.
Our country needs a Military Officer in Obama’s inner circle. Someone of 4 star level in the Army (preferably) or the Air Force needs to be there. General James L. Jones, USMC (retired) was commissioned as a Marine officer. Marines come (and go) under the Secretary of Navy. Our Vice President’s son was a Marine. Adm Thad Allen is US Coast Guard. The US Army needs to be represented.
Donald R. Hodge, PhD.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)