Perception is Key

Perception was more important than reality in the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) strategic nuclear policy of the Cold War.  If a party was perceived as weak enough to be attacked, it would be of little consequence to the millions of dead that the attacking party was wrong.  On the other hand, would one expect to be able to achieve savings by focusing on perception rather than reality?

In the good old days, the US could retaliate against a terrorist country for a terrorist act against the US or a US citizen.  If we got it wrong, nobody knew except for the real perpetrator and, possibly, us.  If someone credible spoke out, we would have a new target.

While thinking about the War on Terror, I realized that, if we have a list of “bad guys/countries”, we can pick a (deserving) target and punish them.  Everybody will think that crime does not pay except for the real perpetrator.

I can see an analogy with local law enforcement.  Now, with DNA evidence, the innocent of the particular crime is being set free but no replacement is being found.

Lessons Learned

Could a “Lessons Learned” be related to a “Teachable Moment”?

While I was still trying desperately hard to earn my pay as a part of the Defense community, my corporation implemented its Systems Engineering website as: Process, Procedures, Tools, and Lessons Learned. Or something similar. There were no Lessons Learned from the past but there was a new database application to record future lessons learned.

My doctorate is in experimental elementary particle physics and my specialty was strong interactions. This was the branch of physics that collected lots of data (bubble chamber photographs), processed them, and then looked for statistical anomalies in the results.

Accelerators, detection devices, and computers were state-of-the-art technology but they were just tools. The information was in the data.

I shared the experience of many during recent decades: I prepared numerous resumes for the newly developed (again) Corporate Database. In 2001, I expressed displeasure with my academic department for sending me a form to provide information for the new department database that was included in the label on the envelope in which the form was received.

I excelled in FORTRAN but I also learned to appreciate COBOL. My working community seemed to like IDEF0; I liked IDEF1X. BPwin was favored by business people; I liked ERwin. My co-workers worked on Conventional Planning and Execution and JDS (Joint Deployment System); I worked on RUM (Resource and Unit Monitoring) and UNIREP.

I have been trained (or learned) that the signal is in the data.

I believe one of the quotes sometimes attributed to Yogi Berra is, “You can hear a lot by just listening.”

If you just listened to a Breitbart interview on CNN, you would have heard that the tape wasn’t about Shirley Sherrod; it was about the NAACP. If you just listened to the “excerpted “tape, you could hear many in the audience chuckle. That was supposed to be the “message” the blogger wanted us to hear.

The Shirley Sherrod incident illustrates the Fog of War. Since it’s not a real war, collateral damage to Shirley Sherrod can be minimized. In a real war, few victims are as lucky.

Gen. Lewis W. Walt, USMC, had a reputation for relieving officers of their command. His view was to protect the units by getting rid of all the bad officers. There were enough good Marines that could fill in for the good ones that were relieved.

“Teachable Moments” may have the same experience as Lessons Learned. People have suggested changing the name to “Lessons Observed”. The rationale is that it is a more descriptive title. The lesson may be observed (possibly, again) but we don’t seem to be able to Learn It. Would the more accurate description for Teachable Moments be “Regrettable Moments”?

(DR)2H

The Fog of War

Military commanders must cope with the uncertainty/ambiguity described as the “fog of war”. In peacetime we may be able to afford the luxury of eliminating all the unknowns. In a war, we cannot. Protecting our coastal areas in the Gulf of Mexico should have been a war. Perhaps generating jobs, jobs, jobs should have been also. The Obama administration appears to believe they can eliminate the fog of war. They appear to be being successful by avoiding war.

The Wiki entry for “Fog of War” describes four levels: Global Strategic, Military Strategic, Operational, and Tactical. The last two are discussed below.

Operational

At the operational level, the theatre commander undertakes tasks as directed by the Military Strategic level, ambiguity related to adversary capability and intent is coupled with own directive ambiguity, the commander not having a full understanding of the strategic imperative. The operational tempo increases at this level and the ambiguity experienced by the commander is susceptible to delays in communication of the tactical situation, the ebb and flow of own force and adversary force interaction. The commander seeks to penetrate the fog of war through significant use of reconnaissance assets and a comprehensive Joint Operational Picture.

Tactical

Ambiguity stems from several factors at the tactical level. Deliberate actions by the enemy (including active deception and/or electronic attack on communications and sensors) contribute as well as factors inherent to battle resulting in lack of comprehension by commanders as to the tactical environment, the logistic status of their own units, how they are interacting with each other, or their intentions. This lack of comprehension can stem from many factors, individually or in combination, such as poor reconnaissance; inaccurate intelligence; or faulty communication. The tempo of decision making at the tactical level is much greater than at other levels, increasing the risk of escalating ambiguity as assumptions build. Real world consequences follow as resources are allocated based on those assumptions.

The fog of war is most easily demonstrated in the tactical battlespace. It may include military commanders' incomplete or inaccurate intelligence concerning their enemy's numbers, disposition, capabilities, and intent, regarding features of the battlefield, and even including incomplete knowledge of the state of their own forces. Fog of war is caused by the limits of reconnaissance, by the enemy's feints and disinformation, by delays in receiving intelligence and difficulties passing orders, and by the difficult task of forming a cogent picture from a very large (or very small) amount of diverse data.

When a force engages in battle and the urgency for good intelligence increases, so does the fog of war and chaos of the battlefield, while military units become preoccupied with fighting or are lost (either destroyed by enemy fire or literally lose their way), reconnaissance and liaison elements become unavailable, and sometimes while real fog and smoke obscure vision. Much of the modern military's technological efforts, under the rubric of “command and control” seek to reduce the fog of war. Although even the most advanced technology cannot completely eliminate it, military theorists continue to develop ways to reduce it.

Adapted from July 13, 2010, Wikipedia entry subject to http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/

For additional reading see: Alan D. Campen, ed., The First Information War (Fairfax: AFCEA International Press 1992).

(DR)2H